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Abstract
The empirical literature on the asset allocation and medical expenditures of
U.S. households consistently shows that risky portfolio shares are increasing in
both wealth and health whereas health investment shares are decreasing in these
same variables. Despite this evidence, most of the existing models treat ﬁnancial
and health-related choices separately. This paper bridges this gap by proposing a
tractable framework for the joint determination of optimal consumption, portfolio
and health investments. We solve for the optimal rules in closed form and show
that the model can theoretically reproduce the empirical facts.
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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom suggests that how wealthy and healthy we are determines how
we allocate resources between ﬁnancial and health-related investments. The empirical
literature on asset allocation and health investments conﬁrms that this is indeed the case
and has outlined three main regularities. First, risky portfolio shares are increasing in
both wealth (e.g. Wachter and Yogo, 2008; Carroll, 2002) and health (Guiso et al., 1996;
Rosen and Wu, 2004, among others). Second, health investment shares are decreasing in
both wealth (e.g. Meer et al., 2003; DiMatteo, 2003) and health (e.g. Smith, 1999; Yogo,
2009). Third, labor income is increasing in health (e.g. Smith, 1999; Rosen and Wu,
2004), although the sensitivity to health tends to decline after retirement (Smith, 1999).
Such strong interactions indicate that the analysis of ﬁnancial and health investments
should be undertaken as that of a joint decision process. Yet, aside from rare exceptions
(e.g. Edwards, 2008; Yogo, 2009), the two are almost always analyzed separately in
theoretical frameworks. At the risk of over-simplifying, health investment models tend
to abstract from ﬁnancial investment decisions whereas health related considerations
are usually absent from portfolio choice models.
The objective of this paper is to bridge this gap by proposing a tractable model of
joint consumption, portfolio and health investment decisions. Our modeling strategy
innovates by combining two well-accepted —but otherwise segmented —models from
the Financial and Health Economics literatures within a uniﬁed setup. More precisely,
we start from a standard Merton (1971) asset allocation problem with IID returns and
intermediate consumption utility, and append to this model a costly health investment
decision a` la Grossman (1972) where better health improves labor income as well as
reduces the agent’s mortality risk through a decrease in his death intensity. We solve
for the optimal rules in closed form and show that the model can theoretically generate
portfolios that increase in health and wealth, along with health investment shares that
decrease in these same variables.
This model provides new insights on the complex relations between health and
wealth statuses on the one hand and ﬁnancial and health decisions on the other. For
instance, it remains unclear through which channel(s) a reduction in health translates
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into increased health investment shares and more conservative portfolio positions (Rosen
and Wu, 2004). First the agent may associate a deteriorated health condition with
a shorter life expectancy. This could increase the desirability of health investments
(assuming that life is valuable). Moreover a shorter available time to recuperate from
adverse ﬁnancial shocks might reduce the attractiveness of risky assets. Second, cross
eﬀects of health on the marginal utility of wealth could result in increased risk aversion
at poor health levels, inducing the agent to reduce exposure to both ﬁnancial and
mortality risks. Third, deteriorated health could translate into lower labor income and
consequently lower human wealth, aﬀecting available resources for both ﬁnancial and
health-related investments. Finally, low health levels could aﬀect the relative returns
to ﬁnancial and health investments if the agent is subject to decreasing returns in
adjusting health levels and/or mortality risks. Contrary to segmented frameworks of
ﬁnancial and health investments, our model can oﬀer guidance as to which (if any)
of these explanations is relevant. In particular, our closed-form solutions emphasize
the reduction in human wealth to explain more conservative portfolios, as well as the
shorter life expectancy and changes in relative returns to explain the increase in health
expenditures when health deteriorates.
As is well-known (e.g. Shepard and Zeckhauser, 1984; Rosen, 1988, among others),
the modeling of preferences is not innocuous in an endogenous mortality setting such
as ours, since preferences are no longer invariant to monotone transformations. In
the standard time-additive framework of Yaari (1965) and Hakansson (1969) utility is
computed as a sum of discounted period utilities up to the random time of death. These
models associate death with a utility level of zero and, thus, imply that the utility of any
consumption schedule must be compared to zero in order to determine whether the agent
is better oﬀ living or dying. In particular, power utility with a relative risk aversion
coeﬃcient larger than one, as is often the case in the literature, implies negative welfare
levels and, thus, yields the counterintuitive result that death is preferable to life.1 Our
1To avoid this outcome, proposed solutions include adding a suﬃciently large positive constant to
utility (see Rosen, 1988; Becker et al., 2005; Hall and Jones, 2007, among others) and restricting the
relative risk aversion to be smaller than one (Shepard and Zeckhauser, 1984). Another possible solution
is to equate death with full depreciation of the health stock and impose Inada conditions on the ﬂow
utility of health, see Yogo (2009).
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approach to this problem innovates by resorting to recursive preferences which allow
to measure utility and consumption in the same metric (Epstein and Zin, 1989; Duﬃe
and Epstein, 1992). With such preferences death is associated with a consumption level
of zero whereas life corresponds to strictly positive consumption and, since preferences
are monotonic, it follows that life is always preferred to death, regardless of parameter
values. A second important feature of our preference speciﬁcation is non-homotheticity.
Iso-elastic utility, coupled with IID returns and a constant investment set, counter-
factually implies that portfolio shares are invariant to wealth levels (Merton, 1971).
Introducing subsistence consumption is a convenient way to generate an endogenous
liquidity constraint and thus risky portfolio shares that profactually increase in ﬁnancial
wealth (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004; Carroll, 2002; Wachter and Yogo, 2008).
In our model, health investment is subject to diminishing returns to scale and enters
the agent’s decision problem through two channels. First, better health increases labor
income through, for example, less frequent sick leaves and/or better access to promotions
for more assiduous workers. Second, better health lowers —but does not completely
eliminate —mortality risk by reducing the agent’s death intensity. In order to gain
some intuition on the respective impact of these two channels, we ﬁrst abstract from
the latter to focus on the former only. In this restricted case, the agent’s mortality risk
is independent from his health status and this allows us to solve for the optimal rules in
closed form. These optimal rules reveal that the risky portfolio shares are proportional
to the ratio of total disposable wealth (i.e. ﬁnancial wealth plus the net present value
of labor income net of investment and subsistence) to ﬁnancial wealth. Since total
disposable wealth increases in the health level, it follows that the risky portfolio shares
increase in health as well. They profactually increase in ﬁnancial wealth as well for
certain levels of health and wealth. We also ﬁnd that the health investment level is
proportional to the health level. Health investment shares thus profactually fall in
ﬁnancial wealth, but counterfactually increase as the agent’s health improves.
Allowing for a health-dependent death intensity makes the agent’s mortality risk
endogenous and, unfortunately, implies that the model can no longer be solved in closed
form. To circumvent this diﬃculty, we resort to a perturbation analysis which uses the
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explicit solution of the health independent mortality case as a benchmark for a ﬁrst
order expansion with respect to the parameter which governs the health dependence of
the agent’s death intensity.2 While it only provides an approximation of the optimal
rules, this perturbation method nevertheless presents several advantages. In particular,
it gives us explicit expressions for the optimal rules and, thus, allows us to interpret the
comparative statics of the model without relying on numerically calibrated parameters.
We ﬁnd that, up to a ﬁrst order approximation, portfolio shares remain independent of
mortality and, therefore, conclude that most of the impact of health on portfolios obtains
through the labor income channel. By contrast, we ﬁnd that endogenous mortality
risk does have a ﬁrst order impact on the optimal health investment. In particular,
diminishing returns to health in the control of mortality risk reduce the attractiveness
of health investments at certain health and wealth levels. The comparative statics thus
show that, contrary to its exogenous mortality version, the model with endogenous
mortality now has the potential to reproduce the observed co-movements.
Perhaps the three most closely related papers are those of Edwards (2008), Yogo
(2009) and Hall and Jones (2007). Edwards (2008) does allow for asset selection in
the presence of health risks, but he completely abstracts from horizon uncertainty and
health-dependent income. Moreover, his distributional assumptions on health are quite
diﬀerent from ours since, in his model, sickness is purely exogenous and requires constant
expenditures once incurred. As a result, Edwards (2008) can neither address the joint
determination of portfolios and health investment as we do, nor study the impact of
endogenous life expectancy on the agent’s decisions.
Yogo (2009) is closer to us in that he also considers portfolio implications of a model
a` la Grossman (1972) where health investments are subject to diminishing returns to
scale. However, his focus on the welfare gains of actuarially fair annuities is quite
diﬀerent from ours. Moreover, he models health as generating direct utility ﬂows instead
of our health-dependent labor income approach.
Hall and Jones (2007) also consider an endogenous mortality model with costly
health investment and positive service ﬂows of better health. However, they do not
2Examples of papers which apply similar perturbation methods in asset pricing include Kogan and
Uppal (2002), Kogan (2001), Chan and Kogan (2002) and Ferretti and Trojani (2005) among others.
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consider portfolio allocations and their focus on the time series of aggregate health
spending and longevity is very diﬀerent. Our preference speciﬁcation also diﬀers as we
advocate non expected utility to guarantee that life is valuable, instead of adding a
positive constant to utility in order to raise the relative value of life.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Following a discussion of the empirical
properties of health and ﬁnancial investments in Section 2, we outline the theoretical
model in Section 3. The solution to the model is presented in Section 4. Finally,
a conclusion in Section 5 reviews the main ﬁndings and suggests potential research
agenda.
2 Stylized facts
In order to motivate the construction of our model, we ﬁrst look at the empirical facts
that characterize the cross-section of risky asset and health investment shares for a
subset of American households. In particular, we outline in this section how health,
wealth and age aﬀect risky asset and health investment shares as well as labor income.
Although we rely on summary statistics to describe the relevant co-movements, our
conclusions are reasonably robust to reduced-form econometric evaluations with socio-
economic covariates.3
2.1 Data sources and details
In our analysis, we rely on the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data set, a widely-
used survey of American individuals aged 51 and over.4 Although not fully repre-
sentative of the entire age distribution of US agents, the HRS data allows for useful
comparisons with other health investment studies that also analyze the same data set.
It provides socio-economic variables, alternative measures of health status and health-
3Speciﬁcally, regressing portfolios or health investment on health and wealth levels, with gender,
race, age, or education co-variates through Tobit estimators yields qualitatively similar results.
4We use the RAND Center for the Study of Aging version of the HRS data ﬁles. This data set includes
the cohort associated with the Study of Assets and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD),
the Children of the Depression (CODA), the War Babies and the initial HRS. See RAND Corporation
(2008) for details. The summary statistics that we report are robust to alternative sampling weights
including uniform weights, household weights, or the person-level analysis weights provided in the RAND
HRS data set.
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related expenditures, in addition to holdings of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial assets. We
focus on a cross-sectional perspective using the ﬁfth wave of HRS (respondents in 2000),
with our sample including both married and single, male and female agents.5
Regarding the deﬁnition of risky portfolios, we follow Rosen and Wu (2004); Berkowitz
and Qiu (2006), in using a four-item classiﬁcation of ﬁnancial assets into safe assets
(checking and saving accounts, money market funds, CD’s, government savings bonds
and T-bills), bonds (corporate, municipal and foreign bonds and bond funds), risky
assets (stock and equity mutual funds) and retirement accounts (IRAs and Keoghs). The
ﬁrst three items are the result of deliberate economic decisions and represent direct asset
holdings, whereas retirement funds capture more indirect portfolio choices. Consistent
with similar applications in the empirical asset pricing literature, we deﬁne net ﬁnancial
wealth as the sum of safe, risky and bond holdings minus debts, and omit pension as
well as social security funds. Risky portfolio shares are simply the percentage of net
ﬁnancial wealth held in risky assets.
We follow a large strand of the Health Economics literature in selecting the self-
reported general health status to measure the health of agents in the data set.6 This
polytomous variable is categorized as poor, fair, good, very good, or excellent. Finally,
the RAND HRS data reports the agents’ total health expenditures and we will use this
variable as our measure of health investment. It includes medical expenditures (doctor
visits, outpatient surgery, hospital and nursing home, home health care, prescription
drugs and special facilities), as well as out-of-pocket medical expenses (uninsured cost
over the two previous years). The health investment share is the percentage of net
ﬁnancial wealth spent on total health expenditures.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the key variables, including demographic
characteristics, health-related measures and ﬁnancial wealth holdings. We distinguish
5The summary statistics that we report below are robust to the choice of the wave in the HRS
data. As pointed out by Yogo (2009) the fact that male and female, unmarried and married individuals
maximize diﬀerent objective functions could result in a source of heterogeneity. However, all of our
results are robust to accounting for such eﬀects.
6See Smith (1999); Deaton and Paxston (1998); Rosen and Wu (2004); Berkowitz and Qiu (2006);
Love and Smith (2007); Yogo (2009) for examples. The validity of self-reported health has been discussed
extensively. See discussions in Ben´ıtez-Silva and Ni (2008); Crossley and Kennedy (2002); Hurd and
McGarry (1995). For robustness, we also considered other health-related measures, such as the self-
reported health change or the number of diagnosed conditions with no qualitative eﬀect on our results.
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between younger (age less than 65) and older agents (age greater than or equal to
65) and associate the latter with retired individuals.7 The average age is 58 for non-
retired and 75 for retired, with a negligible diﬀerence between married and unmarried
individuals. Females make up roughly 60% of the total sample of 19,571 observations.
This percentage varies however with the marital status and is larger for singles.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
As can be seen from the second panel of Table 1 the self-reported health distribution
is skewed towards good or better for younger agents, but displays a deterioration after
age 65. The average health-related total expenditures increases from $10,615 to $15,862
for older agents. These expenditures are generally higher for singles. The cross-sectional
distribution of medical, out-of-pocket, or total expenses is characterized by a long upper
tail with much lower median values (French and Jones, 2004).
For those agents with positive ﬁnancial wealth, we notice that almost all (85%)
hold safe assets. These assets constitute by far the largest share of ﬁnancial wealth
and increase in the post-retirement period from 57 to 65%.8 In comparison, only
9% hold corporate and government bonds corresponding to a meager 2% of ﬁnancial
wealth. Stock holdings are observed for roughly a third of individuals and represent 20%
of wealth on average, with minor diﬀerences in the pre- and post-retirement periods.
Finally, debt remains sizable for many agents and falls noticeably after retirement.
2.2 Relevant co-movements
Tables 2 (non-retired) and 3 (retired) categorize sample statistics in terms of increasing
health levels and increasing ﬁnancial wealth quintiles for the means of the net ﬁnancial
wealth, the probability of holding risky assets, the risky share and the median of the
health investment shares.9 Overall, both tables convey the same messages.
7Our results are robust to using the self-reported retirement status available in HRS instead of a
deﬁnition based on age.
8The interpretation of this ﬁgure may be misleading since almost all individuals in our sample have
Social Security wealth, which can be perceived as a safe asset (Rosen and Wu, 2004).
9We select the median for the heath investment share instead of the mean. Contrary to the risky
probabilities and portfolio shares, the health investment share is not restricted to lie on the unit interval.
As such, it is more sensitive to extreme measures.
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[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here]
First, consistent with similar ﬁndings by Michaud and van Soest (2008); Meer et al.
(2003); Adams et al. (2003), we notice relatively minor variations in ﬁnancial wealth as
health changes. This can be interpreted as indicating that ﬁnancial and human wealth
are segmented measures. Put diﬀerently, contemporary health determines total wealth
through its impact on human and not on ﬁnancial wealth. Second, we notice that both
the probability of holding risky assets and the risky asset shares increase sharply in
ﬁnancial wealth. Similar ﬁndings have been highlighted by Wachter and Yogo (2008);
Guiso et al. (1996); Carroll (2002). Third, consistent with Guiso et al. (1996); Rosen
and Wu (2004); Coile and Milligan (2006); Berkowitz and Qiu (2006); Goldman and
Maestas (2005); Yogo (2009), there exists a positive correlation between health and
risky asset holdings.10 As the health level improves, both the probability of holding
risky assets and the risky asset shares increase, especially for intermediate health level.
Fourth, the health investment shares decrease when either ﬁnancial wealth increases or
health improves. Moreover, this ﬁnding is robust to the type of health investment under
consideration, whether expenditures include insured spending (as in total expenditures)
or uninsured spending (out-of-pocket expenditures). Similar ﬁndings are discussed in
Meer et al. (2003); DiMatteo (2003) (decreasing in wealth) and in Smith (1999); Yogo
(2009) (decreasing in health).
Table 4 next presents descriptive statistics in function of health and age when wealth
is ﬁxed at the third quintile.11 We notice that both the probability of risky asset holdings
and their portfolio shares fall at retirement, whereas the health investment shares tend
to increase. However, conditional upon a given health level, the statistics show that both
the risky asset holdings and the health investment shares are relatively independent of
age in the post-retirement phase. The latter presents a ﬂat pattern in the ﬁrst 20 years
following retirement but tends to increase over 85, probably reﬂecting the explosion in
medical expenditures in the last period of life. Age-independent risky portfolios can
10Kochar (2004) ﬁnds similar health-portfolio links in developing countries. See however Love and
Smith (2007); Fan and Zhao (2009) for a more reserved interpretation which accounts for unobserved
heterogeneity.
11The results are relatively insensitive to the choice of the wealth quintile level.
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also be found using the HRS data reported in Coile and Milligan (2006) to construct a
measure of ﬁnancial wealth that is similar to ours. Wachter and Yogo (2008); Gomes and
Michælides (2005); Ameriks and Zeldes (2004); Rosen and Wu (2004); Poterba (2001)
also document ﬂat age proﬁles for risky portfolios. The initially ﬂat proﬁle for health
investment shares is also consistent with weak age eﬀects in international comparisons
in health care expenditure shares once proximity to death is taken into account (Zweifel
et al., 2004; Gerdtham and Jo¨nsson, 2000; Felder et al., 2000).
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Finally, we are interested in measuring the impact of health on revenues. For this
purpose, we regress total income on health in Table 5 in order to gauge its impact.12
Overall, regardless of the type of estimator and/or the set of explanatory variables, the
regressions convey the same message: income depends positively on the health level and
this eﬀect is larger in the pre- than in the post-retirement phase. French (2005); Smith
(1999); Deaton and Paxston (1998); Bodie et al. (1992) also document the positive
relation between health and labor income using American data whereas Kochar (2004)
provides further evidence of strong health eﬀects on income in developing economies. It
can be explained by lower absenteeism for healthier workers, with potential implications
for promotion decisions. The positive post-retirement health gradient highlights the fact
that certain elders may still ﬁnd it convenient to continue working after 65. The lower
health gradient and higher constant term after that age reﬂects the increased importance
of pension and other non-wage income in the post-retirement phase.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
To summarize, the analysis of the HRS data set reveals the following empirical
regularities: (i) the contemporary ﬁnancial wealth is independent of contemporary
health level, (ii) the labor income depends positively on the health level, with a stronger
eﬀect in the pre- than in the post-retirement phase, (iii) both the risky portfolio and the
health investment shares are relatively insensitive to age in the post-retirement phase.
12We measure total income as the sum of earnings (wages/salary), capital income, pensions or
annuities, Social Security beneﬁts as well as unemployment and other government transfers.
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We have also shown that (iv) the risky portfolio shares of ﬁnancial wealth increase in
both health and in ﬁnancial wealth. Conversely, (v) the health investment shares of
ﬁnancial wealth decrease in both health and in ﬁnancial wealth. In the next section,
our theoretical model will be constructed by assuming the ﬁrst three regularities and
will aim at reproducing the last two ﬁndings.
3 The model
This section describes an economic environment in which the agent has preferences over
lifetime consumption plans in the presence of partially controllable mortality.
3.1 Survival and health dynamics
Following Ehrlich (2000); Ehrlich and Yin (2005) and Hall and Jones (2007) among
others, we model the agent’s mortality as a partially endogenous Poisson process whose
intensity depends on the agent’s health status. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the agent’s
death intensity is given by
lim
푠→0
1
푠
푃푡
[
푡 < 휏 ≤ 푡+ 푠] = 휆(퐻푡) = 휆0 + 휆1
퐻휉푡
(1)
for some nonnegative constants 휆0, 휆1 and 휉, where 휏 is the random duration of the
agent’s lifetime or, equivalently, the agent’s age of death, the nonnegative process 퐻
represents the agent’s health status and 푃푡(⋅) is a conditional probability. The fact
that the intensity function is decreasing in health ensures that the agent’s survival
probability:
푃0[휏 > 푡] = 퐸0
[
푒−
∫ 푡
0 휆(퐻푠)d푠
]
(2)
is monotone increasing in the health status. As the agent’s health status improves, his
death intensity decreases but it never falls below the level 휆0. Intuitively, an agent can
increase his survival probability by investing in his health and still die from an exogenous
shock, such as an accident, or an illness that does not depend on controllable health
(e.g. certain types of cancer). Alternatively, this incompressible part of the intensity can
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be interpreted as an endowed death probability that is determined by natural and/or
biological factors.
The speciﬁcation of the survival probability in equation (2) is closely related to that
proposed by Ehrlich (2000) or by Ehrlich and Yin (2005). However, we diﬀer along two
dimensions. First, we make the incompressible part of the death intensity constant,
rather than age-varying.13 Second, we let the endogenous part of the death intensity
be a function of the current health status rather than of the agent’s health investment.
This assumption implies that the agent cannot fully solve contemporaneous health-
related problems by investing large amounts in times of need and, hence, reﬂects the
path dependence of health-related decisions.
In the spirit of Grossman (1972), we model the agent’s health status as a locally
deterministic process whose growth/decay rate is a function of current health investment
and health status. More precisely, we assume that the agent’s health status evolves
according to
d퐻푡 =
(
퐼훼푡 퐻
1−훼
푡 − 훿퐻푡
)
d푡, 퐻0 > 0, (3)
for some constants 훼 ∈ (0, 1), 훿 ≥ 0, where the nonnegative process 퐼 represents his
health investment.14
The above dynamics specify that the agent’s health status depreciates at a rate 훿
and that gross health investment 퐼훼퐻1−훼 displays constant returns to scale. This last
assumption implies that the growth rate of the agent’s health status has decreasing
returns in the investment to health ratio. Hence, a given health investment will have
a larger impact on the growth rate of health when the agent is sick, than when he
is healthy.15 The constraint that health investment cannot be negative is standard
13This assumption can be relaxed by letting the incompressible part of the intensity be a function of
the agent’s age. Our results still hold in this more general setup but we maintain the assumption that
휆0 is constant for simplicity.
14The assumption of a constant 훿 is again made for simplicity but can be relaxed in favor of an
age-dependent depreciation rate, with our main results still holding.
15Similar decreasing returns to health investments can be found in Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) and
Ehrlich (2000); Ehrlich and Yin (2005). An equivalent interpretation of equation (3) is that the agent’s
is endowed with a health production function that is linear in gross health investment 퐼푔 = 퐼
훼퐻1−훼
but faces convex health adjustment costs given by 퐼 = 퐼
1/훼
푔 퐻
1−1/훼.
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in the Health Economics literature.16 It reﬂects the irreversibility of health related
expenditures and the fact that health is not a traded asset.
Our assumption of a (locally) deterministic process in (3) implies that we explicitly
abstract from instantaneous health shocks. This hypothesis may appear restrictive,
given that unanticipated changes in health have been shown to have strong impacts on
both ﬁnancial investments and health expenditures (Rosen and Wu, 2004; Smith, 1999)
and should ideally be accounted for. Nonetheless, our decision to abstract from health
shocks is motivated by three elements.
First, a deterministic process for d퐻푡 allows us to derive closed-form solutions
that are unattainable otherwise. Undiversiﬁable mortality risk paired with a health
asset that cannot be bought and sold freely implies that our setup is characterized by
incompleteness. Such incomplete-markets frameworks are notoriously diﬃcult to solve
analytically, even in settings that are much simpliﬁed compared to ours. Nevertheless,
in Section 3.5 below, the Poisson assumption will be shown to imply an iso-morphism
with a complete market and endogenous discounting problem whose solution can be
obtained. Appending health risk to mortality risk would unfortunately break that iso-
morphism. Although numerical solution would then remain possible, they lose the
tractability oﬀered by closed-form optimal rules.
Second, the locally deterministic health assumption does follow a long tradition in
Health Economics of abstracting from minor health shocks when studying optimal health
investment in the presence of partially endogenous mortality.17 This hypothesis can be
understood as ruling out inconsequential health shocks (e.g. suﬀering from a headache
or a cold) that are non-life threatening and/or have limited income implications when
focusing on mortality risk. Instead, uncontrollable mortal health shocks are subsumed
in the 휆0 term, whereas controllable life-threatening shocks are captured by the 휆1퐻
−휉
푡
term in (1).18
16See for example Grossman (1972); Ehrlich and Chuma (1990); Chang (1996); Picone et al. (1998);
Ehrlich (2000); Edwards (2008); Hall and Jones (2007).
17See Grossman (1972); Ehrlich and Chuma (1990); Ehrlich (2000); Chang (2005) and Hall and Jones
(2007) among others.
18Note that if the agent forgoes the possibility of health investment, then our speciﬁcation of the
intensity function conforms with Gompertz’ law according to which human mortality rates increase
exponentially with age. See Wetterstrand (1981) and Leung (1994) among others for details.
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Finally, it should be kept in mind that a locally deterministic process in (3) does not
imply a non-stochastic process for health along the optimal path. Indeed, as will become
clear shortly, optimal health investments will remain subject to stochastic movements
in wealth caused by ﬁnancial shocks.19 Although instantaneous movements in health
are perfectly forecastable, their long-term evolution is not, such that health, income and
the intensity of mortality risk all remain stochastic in the long run.
3.2 Income dynamics
To introduce life cycle considerations into the model, we identify time 푡 with the agent’s
age and assume that, if alive, the agent is employed (푖 = 푒) up to some ﬁxed age 푇 and
retired thereafter (푖 = 푟).
The agent’s ﬂow rate of income/pension per unit of time depends on his employment
status and is deﬁned by
푌푡 = 푌 (푡,퐻푡) = 1{푇>푡}푌 e푡 + 1{푇≤푡}푌
r
푡 . (4)
In this equation, the nonnegative processes 푌 푖 are related to the agent’s employment
status and are given by
푌 푖푡 = 푌
푖(퐻푡) = 푦
푖 + 훽푖퐻푡, (5)
for some nonnegative constants 푦e, 푦r, 훽e and 훽r.20
Since 훽푖 is nonnegative, the above speciﬁcation implies that the agent’s income
increases with his health status. A natural interpretation is that employers oﬀer higher
wages to agents who are in better health and thus less subject to be absent from work.
Equivalently, a healthier agent tends to miss less workdays and, hence, receives higher
labor income. Since 훽r can be diﬀerent from zero, the income speciﬁcation of (5)
allows for health dependent post-retirement income. As explained in Section 2 this
potential dependence is due to the fact that some agents continue working even after
19As equation (38) below makes it clear, optimal health investment remains wealth-dependent and
therefore subject to ﬁnancial shocks.
20The model can be generalized to allow for age varying, stochastic intercepts 푦e and 푦r. We restrict
our analysis to constant intercepts for the sake of simplicity and in order to focus on the eﬀect of health
on the agent’s portfolio, consumption and health investment decisions.
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retirement. Consistent with the empirical evidence also presented in Section 2, we allow
for diﬀerences in pre and post-retirement health elasticities of income.
3.3 Preferences
Starting with the seminal contributions of Yaari (1965) and Hakansson (1969), the
standard way of specifying preferences in the presence of mortality risk has been to
assume that the continuation utility, to an agent of age 푡, of a lifetime consumption
plan 푐 is given by
푈푡 = 1{휏>푡}퐸푡
[∫ 휏
푡
푒−휌(푠−푡)푢(푐푠)d푠
]
(6)
for some subjective rate of time preference 휌 ≥ 0 and some concave period utility
function 푢(⋅) satisfying standard regularity conditions.21
As pointed out by Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984) and Rosen (1988), the level of the
period utility function has important implications in such a speciﬁcation since adding a
nonnegative constant to 푢(⋅) raises the value that the agent places on longevity relative
to consumption. Put diﬀerently, in the presence of an uncertain horizon, preferences are
not invariant to aﬃne and more generally monotone transformations as they are in the
standard setting where the horizon is ﬁxed and non random. This anomaly is due to
the fact that equation (6) attributes a utility of zero to death and, hence, implies that
the utility of any consumption schedule must be compared to zero in order to determine
whether the agent is better oﬀ living or dying. In particular, if the period utility is
taken to be of the HARA type
푢(푐) =
(푐− 푎)1−훾
1− 훾 , 푐 ≥ 푎, (7)
for some nonnegative constants 푎 and 훾 ∕= 1 then the agent’s preferences towards
mortality depend on whether the risk aversion parameter 훾 is smaller or larger than
unity. In the former case, the utility of any consumption is positive and it follows
21See for example Richard (1975); Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984); Rosen (1988); Ehrlich and Chuma
(1990); Ehrlich (2000); Becker et al. (2005); Edwards (2008); Hall and Jones (2007) and Yogo (2009)
among others.
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that the agent always prefers life to death. On the contrary, if 훾 > 1, as is often
found in empirical studies, then the utility of any consumption plan is negative and it
follows that the agent counterfactually prefers death to life irrespective of his current
consumption level. Preference for death over life is not only unrepresentative, but
also implies that the agent may select negative levels for 퐼푡 in order to accelerate the
timing of death. Technically, a negative 퐼푡 is not compatible with decreasing returns,
such as encompassed by our Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation (3) for arbitrary levels of 훼.
More importantly, although negative net investments d퐻푡 are admissible and feasible,
negative gross investments are not; we may adjust health levels downwards by letting
it depreciate but certainly cannot sell our health continuously in markets for medical,
ethical, and market incompleteness reasons.
To obtain sensible results, most of the authors who use the preference speciﬁcation
in equation (6) thus restrict their study to nonnegative period utility functions for which
any life is always preferred to death. Following this approach, Rosen (1988); Becker et
al. (2005) and Hall and Jones (2007) among others specify a period utility of the form
푣(푐) = 푏+ 푢(푐)
where the constant 푏 is chosen in such a way as to guarantee that the function 푣(⋅)
is nonnegative. Unfortunately, such a constant exists only if the utility function is
bounded from below and it follows that this approach cannot be used to accommodate
the case where the period utility function is given by equation (7) for some risk aversion
parameter 훾 greater than unity.
Motivated by the above discussion and in particular by the fact that the speciﬁcation
in equation (6) cannot reconcile an empirically plausible level of risk aversion with
a sensible behavior towards mortality, we will forgo the time additive speciﬁcation.
Instead we assume that the agent has recursive preferences of the type proposed by
Kreps and Porteus (1979); Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) in discrete time; and
by Duﬃe and Epstein (1992); Schroder and Skiadas (1999) in continuous time. As we
show below, when generalized to include a random horizon, such preferences allow to
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remedy the above deﬁciencies of time additive preferences while maintaining a tractable
setup.
Let 푈푡 = 푈푡(푐) denote for the continuation utility of a consumption plan 푐 of an agent
of age 푡. Introducing a random horizon into the Kreps–Porteus preference speciﬁcation
of Duﬃe and Epstein (1992), we assume that 푈 satisﬁes the recursive integral equation
푈푡 = 1{휏>푡}퐸푡
[∫ 휏
푡
(
푓(푐푠, 푈푠)− 훾
2푈푠
∣휎푠(푈)∣2
)
d푠
]
(8)
where 휎(푈) measures the instantaneous volatility of the continuation utility,22 and 푓(⋅)
is the intertemporal aggregator deﬁned by
푓(푐, 푣) =
푣휌
1− 1/휀
[(
푐− 푎
푣
)1−1/휀
− 1
]
. (9)
In the above equation the nonnegative constants 휌, 푎, 휀 and 훾 represent, respectively,
the agent’s subjective rate of time preferences, his subsistence consumption level, his
elasticity of intertemporal substitution and his risk aversion over static gambles.23
As pointed out by Duﬃe and Epstein (1992), the fact that the aggregator function
푓(⋅) is homogenous of degree one with respect to (푐−푎, 푣) implies that the continuation
utility is homogenous of degree one with respect to (푐−푎) and it follows that the agent’s
utility is measured in the same unit as excess consumption. In particular, the agent’s
utility is always nonnegative and, since death is associated with zero utility, it follows
that the agent sees his own mortality as detrimental irrespective of whether his risk
aversion coeﬃcient, 훾, is smaller or larger than unity.
The speciﬁcation of the continuation utility in equation (8) captures non homothetic
preferences for 푎 ∕= 0 and iso-elastic preferences otherwise. Non homotheticity is
often advocated as a mean to generate risky portfolio shares that increase in wealth.24
22More precisely, 휎푡(푈) = d⟨푈,푍⟩푡/d푡 measures the instantaneous covariance of the continuation
utility process with the Brownian motion driving market returns.
23In the absence of mortality risk, our speciﬁcation of the agent’s preferences boils down to time
additive power utility under the usual parametric restriction that 휀 = 1/훾.
24For example, Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2004) and Wachter and Yogo (2008) assume that agents have non
separable preferences in consumption and luxury goods. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) extend non
separability to consumption and a habit stock, whereas Carroll (2002) adds a HARA bequest to a CRRA
period utility function.
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Our speciﬁcation of the agent’s continuation utility does not include bequest motives.
The reason for this restriction is mainly technical: adding a bequest to our setup
with endogenous mortality considerably complicates the analysis and prevents us from
deriving closed form solutions even in the case where the death intensity is independent
from the health status.25
3.4 Financial market and budget constraint
The ﬁnancial market is frictionless and consists of two continuously traded securities.
The ﬁrst of these securities is a locally riskless bond whose time 푡 price is given by
푆0푡 = 푒
푟푡 (10)
for some constant rate of interest 푟 > 0. The second security is a risky stock and we
assume that its price evolves according to
d푆푡 = 휇푆푡d푡+ 휎푆푡d푍푡, 푆0 > 0, (11)
for some constant growth rate 휇 ≥ 푟 and constant volatility 휎 > 0 where the process 푍
is a one dimensional standard Brownian motion.26
Let 푤 denote the agent’s ﬁnancial wealth at birth and 휋 denote the fraction of his
wealth that the agent invests in the stock. Under the usual self-ﬁnancing requirement
the agent’s ﬁnancial wealth evolves according to
d푊푡 = (푟푊푡 + 푌푡 − 퐼푡 − 푐푡)d푡+푊푡휋푡휎(d푍푡 + 휃d푡), (12)
25Bequest motives are admittedly relevant in an endogenous mortality setting such as ours. For
instance, Love et al. (2009) emphasize their role (in addition to uncertain lifetime and medical
expenditures) in explaining observed life cycle for annualized comprehensive wealth in HRS data, notably
the fact that it is rising, rather than declining as life horizon shortens. This being said, the panel data
evidence is mixed concerning the role of bequest motives in explaining the behavior of retired agents. For
example, Hurd (2002) ﬁnds no clear evidence of a bequest motive behind savings decisions, whereas Hurd
(1987) ﬁnds no diﬀerences in the saving behavior of the elderly who have children compared to those
who don’t. Similarly, Hurd (1989) ﬁnds no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the net present value of expected
bequests of elderly agents when there is a bequest motive compared to when there is none. Hurd and
Smith (2002) document that the importance of post-retirement dis-saving implies low bequests.
26The assumption of a single risky security is made purely for expositional simplicity. Under the
assumption of a constant investment opportunity set, the model can be easily generalized to include
multiple risky securities.
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subject to 푊0 = 푤 where the constant 휃 = (휇 − 푟)/휎 denotes the market price of risk
induced by the prices of the traded assets.
3.5 The decision problem
In the ﬁrst part of his life the agent is employed and has an horizon which is the minimum
of 휏 and 푇 . This implies that, prior to retirement, the indirect utility function and the
optimal rules are functions of the agent’s age, 푡, ﬁnancial wealth, 푊 and health status,
퐻. In contrast, the indirect utility and optimal rules become age independent after
retirement since our model does not distinguish age among retired agents. Taking this
into account, we will from now on write all quantities as functions of (푡,푊,퐻) with the
understanding that the age dependence terminates after retirement.
The agent’s problem consists in choosing a portfolio, consumption and health in-
vestment strategy to maximize his lifetime utility. This implies that the indirect utility
of the agent at age 푡 is given by
푉 (푡,푊푡, 퐻푡) = sup
(휋,푐,퐼)
푈푡(푐), (13)
subject to equations (1), (3), (4) and (12), where 푈(푐) is the continuation utility
associated with the consumption plan 푐 through equation (8).
Our formulation of the agent’s decision problem parallels the widely used approach
of specifying a health dependent utility and omitting health dependent income.27 To see
this, abstract from the dependence of the agent’s income on his employment status by
letting 푦푖 = 푦, 훽푖 = 훽 in equation (5) and set 푥 = 푐−훽퐻. Straightforward manipulations
reveal that
푉 (푡,푊푡, 퐻푡) = sup
(휋,푥,퐼)
푈푡(푥+ 훽퐻),
subject to equation (3) and the modiﬁed budget constraint
푑푊푡 = (푟푊푡 + 푦 − 퐼푡 − 푥푡)d푡+푊푡휋푡휎(d푍푡 + 휃d푡).
27Examples include Grossman (1972), Ehrlich and Chuma (1990), Picone et al. (1998), Ehrlich (2000),
Edwards (2008), Hall and Jones (2007) and Yogo (2009).
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Hence, solving the agent’s optimization problem using the non separable, health depen-
dent intertemporal aggregator
푔(푐,퐻, 푣) = 푓(푐+ 훽퐻, 푣),
and abstracting from health dependent income is equivalent to solving our formula-
tion of the agent’s problem with health independent preferences and health dependent
income.28
Since the uncertain duration of his lifetime cannot be hedged by trading in the
market, the agent faces an incomplete market. However, under the assumption of Pois-
son mortality, the agent’s problem can be conveniently transformed into an equivalent
inﬁnite horizon problem with endogenous discounting and complete ﬁnancial markets.
Indeed, using equation (2) and the law of iterated expectations we can write continuation
utility as
푈푡(푐) = 1{휏>푡}푈표푡
where the process 푈표 = 푈표(푐) satisﬁes the inﬁnite horizon, recursive integral equation
given by
푈표푡 = 퐸푡
[∫ ∞
푡
푒−
∫ 푠
푡 휆(퐻푢)d푢
(
푓(푐푠, 푈
표
푠 )−
훾
2푈표푠
∣휎푠(푈표)∣2
)
d푠
]
. (14)
This formulation brings to light the two channels through which health enters the
agent’s problem. First, health can be interpreted as a durable good which generates
service ﬂows through the agent’s income. Second, health determines the endogenous
rate at which the agent discounts future consumption and continuation utilities. We
show in the next sections that both the service ﬂow and the discounting channels are
necessary to generate the observed patterns of portfolio and health investment shares.
28Relaxing the employment status restrictions 푦푖 = 푦, 훽푖 = 훽 implies that the agent has an
age and health dependent intertemporal aggregator whose health elasticity depends on the agent’s
age/employment status through the constants 훽e and 훽r.
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4 Optimal rules
This section derives the solution to our model. As explained above, health enters the
agent’s problem through two channels: the mortality channel and the income channel.
In order to gain some intuition on the respective impact of these two channels we start
by analyzing the case where the agent’s mortality is independent from his health status
and, thus, cannot be controlled. We then turn to the analysis of the general case where
the agent’s health status inﬂuences both his mortality rate and his income.
4.1 Health independent mortality
When 휆1 = 0 the agent’s mortality rate is constant and, as a result, his objective
function is independent from his health. In conjunction with the fact that ﬁnancial
markets are complete, this implies that the problem can be solved in two steps as in
the human capital model of Bodie et al. (1992). First, compute the optimal health
investment by maximizing the present value of the agent’s disposable income. Second,
obtain the optimal portfolio and optimal consumption plan by solving the problem of
an hypothetical agent who has no income and no subsistence consumption, but whose
ﬁnancial wealth is equal to the total disposable wealth of the original agent.
Since ﬁnancial markets are complete, the present value of the agent’s disposable
income is given by
푃 (푡,퐻푡) = sup
퐼≥0
퐸푡
[∫ ∞
푡
휉푡,푠
(
푌 (푠,퐻푠)− 푎− 퐼푠
)
푑푠
]
(15)
subject to equation (3), where the nonnegative process
휉푡 = exp
(
−푟푡− 휃푍푡 − 1
2
휃2푡
)
(16)
is the stochastic discount factor induced by the price of the traded securities and we
have set 휉푡,푠 ≡ 휉푠/휉푡. The following proposition derives an analytical solution for the
present value of the agent’s disposable income and for the optimal health investment.
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Proposition 1 Let 휆1 = 0 and assume that
훽r < (푟 + 훿)
1
훼 . (17)
Then the present value of the agent’s disposable income and the optimal health invest-
ment strategy are given by
푃 (푡,퐻) = 퐵(푡)퐻 + 퐶(푡), (18)
퐼0(푡,퐻) = 퐻
(
훼푃퐻(푡,퐻)
) 1
1−훼 = 퐻
(
훼퐵(푡)
) 1
1−훼 , (19)
where a subscript denotes a partial derivative,
퐶(푡) =
∫ ∞
푡
푒−푟(푠−푡)
(
푌 (푠, 0)− 푎)푑푠, (20)
and 퐵(⋅) is a nonnegative function of the agent’s age which is deﬁned in the appendix.
The restriction imposed by equation (17) is a transversality condition which guarantees
that the present value of the agent’s disposable income is ﬁnite. Since the constants
푟, 훿, 훽r and 훼 are all nonnegative by assumption, this restriction eﬀectively limits the
convexity of the agent’s health adjustment technology and/or sets a minimal health
depreciation rate to compensate for the sensitivity of the agent’s income to his health
status.
The present value of the agent’s disposable income can be decomposed in two parts.
First 퐶(⋅) gives the present value of the health independent part of the agent’s lifetime
income net of subsistence consumption expenditures. Second, the product 퐵(⋅)퐻 gives
the present value of the health dependent part of the agent’s lifetime income net of
optimal health investments, i.e. 퐵(⋅) measures the shadow price (i.e. marginal 푞) of
health. The fact that both this present value and the optimal investment are linear
in the agent’s health status follows from the linearity of the agent’s income and the
Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation of the health adjustment technology.29
29See Uzawa (1969), Hayashi (1982) and Abel and Eberly (1994) among others for similar results in
the investment literature where this property is referred to as the equivalence between marginal and
average 푞.
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Having computed the present value of the agent’s disposable income and the optimal
health investment strategy, we now turn to the determination of the optimal portfolio
and consumption strategy. Let
푁푡 = 푁(푡,푊푡, 퐻푡) = 푊푡 + 푃 (푡,퐻푡) (21)
denote the agent’s total wealth net of subsistence consumption expenditures. Using the
result of Proposition 1 in conjunction with equation (12) we obtain that the agent’s
total disposable wealth evolves according to
d푁푡 = (푟푁푡 − 푥푡)d푡+푁푡휈푡휎(d푍푡 + 휃d푡), (22)
where the modiﬁed portfolio and consumption strategy (휈, 푥) is related to the original
one through 휈 = (푊/푁)휋 and 푥 = 푐 − 푎. This implies that the agent’s indirect utility
function can be written as
푉0(푡,푊,퐻) = 퐹 (푡,푁(푡,푊,퐻)) (23)
where the function 퐹 (⋅) is deﬁned by
퐹 (푡,푁푡) = sup
(푥,휈)
푈푡(푥+ 푎) (24)
subject to the dynamic budget constraint in equation (22). The solution to this modiﬁed
portfolio and consumption choice problem with recursive utility and IID returns is well-
known and can be found in Svensson (1989) and Obstfeld (1994) among others. Using
this solution to construct the agent’s optimal strategy gives the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Let 휆1 = 0 and assume that equation (17) and
퐴 = 휀휌+ (1− 휀)
(
푟 − 휆0 + 1
2훾
휃2
)
>
(
푟 − 휆0 + 1
훾
휃2
)+
(25)
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hold. The indirect utility function of a living agent of age 푡 is
푉0(푡,푊,퐻) = 휌(퐴/휌)
1
1−휀푁(푡,푊,퐻), (26)
and generates the optimal portfolio, optimal consumption and optimal health investment
strategy given by
휋0(푡,푊,퐻) =
휃
훾휎푊
푁(푡,푊,퐻), (27)
푐0(푡,푊,퐻) = 푎+퐴푁(푡,푊,퐻), (28)
and equation (19). Here, 푁(⋅) represents the agent’s total disposable wealth as deﬁned
by equation (21) and 퐵(⋅) is deﬁned as in Proposition 1.
As explained in Smith (1996), the restriction imposed by equation (25) serves two
purposes. On the one hand, it guarantees that the agent’s marginal propensity to
consume, 퐴, is strictly positive and, hence, that the optimal consumption plan 푐0 is
feasible. On the other hand, it insures that the indirect utility indeed coincides with
the continuation utility of the optimal consumption plan 푐0 as deﬁned by equation (8)
and, thus, is a transversality condition. The exact form of the restriction is entirely
standard (e.g. Svensson, 1989; Smith, 1996), except for the presence of the mortality
rate 휆0 which reﬂects the impact of mortality on the agent’s consumption decisions.
It is of interest to contrast the optimal rules in Theorem 1 with those obtained under
separable VNM utility. To do so, assume that 휀 = 1/훾 so that, absent mortality risk,
the agent has time additive preferences. In this case equation (25) gives
퐴표 = 퐴
∣∣
휀=1/훾
=
휌+ 휆0
훾
+
(
1− 1
훾
)(
푟 +
1
2훾
휃2
)
− 휆0
which is diﬀerent from the marginal propensity to consume 퐴vnm = 퐴표 +휆0 that would
be obtained under the time additive HARA preference speciﬁcation of equations (6) and
(7). The reason for this diﬀerence is that we take into account the impact of mortality
23
on the certainty equivalent of future consumption and not on its utility. This allows us
to guarantee that mortality is detrimental to the agent.
Equation (25) reveals that introducing exogenous mortality is equivalent to de-
creasing the interest rate and thereby leads to two conﬂicting eﬀects. First, a lower
interest rate implies that more resources are needed to fund a given amount of future
consumption and, thus, encourages the agent to consume less today in order to maintain
the same level of future consumption. Second, a decrease in the interest rate implies
that current consumption is less costly relative to future consumption and, thus, leads to
consume more today through a substitution eﬀect. When the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, 휀, is smaller than unity, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and the agent reduces his
marginal propensity to consume in response to exogenous mortality. Conversely, when
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is greater than unity, the substitution eﬀect
dominates and the agent increases his marginal propensity to consume in response to
an increase in his mortality rate. Exact cancelation of the two eﬀects occurs if 휀 = 1 in
which case mortality has no impact on consumption.
Equations (26) and (27) show that, when the agent cannot control it, mortality risk
decreases his indirect utility function but has no impact on the optimal portfolio. The
intuition behind these results is straightforward. Indeed, an increase in the mortality
rate implies a decrease in the utility of any given consumption schedule and, hence,
a decrease in the indirect utility. On the other hand, the property that the optimal
portfolio is independent from the agent’s mortality rate follows from the well-known
fact that, in the absence of hedging demands, the optimal portfolio is independent of
the agent’s planning horizon, (see Richard, 1975, for details).
The share of the agent’s wealth allocated to risky assets has the usual mean variance
eﬃcient form in that it is increasing in the market Sharpe ratio, 휃/휎 and decreasing
in the risk aversion parameter, 훾. However and in stark contrast to the standard case
of homothetic preferences without human capital (푎 = 훽푖 = 푦푖 = 0), the optimal
portfolio share is not constant but a function of the agent’s age, wealth and health status.
As the agent’s health improves, the present value of his disposable income increases
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and his portfolio share increases.30 To understand this eﬀect it suﬃces to observe
that the presence of income and a non zero subsistence consumption level generates
an endogenous liquidity constraint which forces the agent to keep his ﬁnancial wealth,
푊 , high enough for his total disposable wealth, 푁 , to be nonnegative. As the agent’s
health status improves, this constraint softens due to the increase in the present value
of future income and, consequently, more risky assets can be held today.
The impact of the agent’s ﬁnancial wealth on his portfolio share depends crucially
on whether the present value of his disposable income is positive or negative. Since
the agent’s health is deterministic along the optimal path, the present value of his
disposable income is also non stochastic. In the spirit of Bodie et al. (1992), this
implies that receiving this disposable income is equivalent to holding a position in the
bond. When the present value of his disposable income is positive (negative), the agent
implicitly holds a long (short) position in the bond and thus can invest more (less)
in the risky asset than he would have absent human capital. As the agent’s ﬁnancial
wealth increases, the absolute value of this implicit position in the bond decreases in
percentage of ﬁnancial wealth and, as a result, his portfolio share gets closer to the
constant share 휃/(휎훾) that he would have chosen in the absence of human capital and
subsistence consumption. This implies that the agent’s portfolio share increases as a
function of wealth as long as the present value of his disposable income is negative and
decreases otherwise.
In order for the present value of the agent’s disposable income to be negative, as
required to generate the observed patterns of portfolio shares, it must be the case that
(i) his subsistence consumption level is high enough relative to the health independent
part of his labor income in the sense that 퐶(푡) ≤ 0 and (ii) that his health status is not
too high. In particular, if the agent’s subsistence consumption is equal to zero, i.e. if
the agent has homothetic preferences, then the present value of his disposable income
is positive at all times since and, as a result, his portfolio share is a decreasing function
of ﬁnancial wealth.
30Throughout this discussion we maintain the assumption that the agent’s ﬁnancial wealth is
nonnegative. If this is not the case then the comparative statics of the optimal portfolio share with
respect to ﬁnancial wealth and health status are simply reversed due the mechanical eﬀect of dividing
by a negative quantity.
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Since 휆1 = 0 the agent’s mortality rate is purely exogenous and, as a result, so is the
eﬀective discount rate. Since consumption and investment are then separated decisions,
exogenous discounting does not aﬀect investment and mortality is irrelevant for health
investment rules. From equation (19), the optimal health investment is proportional to
the agent’s health status but independent of his ﬁnancial wealth. As a result, the health
investment share
퐼푠0(푡,푊,퐻) =
퐼0(푡,퐻)
푊
=
퐻
푊
(
훼퐵(푡)
) 1
1−훼 (29)
decreases in wealth, as required to explain the data, but counterfactually increases in
health. Equations (3) and (19) together imply that the optimal growth rate of health is
deterministic and independent from the agent’s health status. It follows that changes in
the agent’s health status have no impact on the returns to health investments. On the
other hand, the income eﬀect of health is still present and is the only driving force behind
the comparative statics of health investment. As the agent’s health status improves,
the present value of his disposable income increases and, since returns are unaﬀected,
the agent increases his health investment.
The restriction of the model studied in this section abstracts from the mortality
reducing eﬀects of health investments and only accounts for the impact of health through
the agent’s income. This speciﬁcation allows to reproduce the fact that empirical portfo-
lio shares increase in both health and ﬁnancial wealth, with the latter property obtaining
when the agent’s human capital does not cover his subsistence consumption needs.
In accordance with the data, the model also produces health investment shares that
are decreasing in ﬁnancial wealth. However, the model counterfactually predicts that
healthier agents should invest more in their health. In the next section we reintroduce
health dependent mortality in order to verify whether or not this additional channel of
health dependence is able to explain the observed patterns of health investment without
altering the favorable performance of the model with respect to portfolio.
4.2 Health dependent mortality
When 휆1 ∕= 0 the agent’s mortality rate depends on his health status. In this case,
one can no longer determine the optimal heath investment policy independently of the
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optimal portfolio and consumption strategy since, as shown by equation (14), the agent’s
objective function now depends on his health status through the mortality rate’s impact
on the endogenous discount rate.
Using standard calculations (e.g. Duﬃe and Epstein, 1992) we obtain that the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation associated with the agent’s optimization prob-
lem is given by
휆(퐻)푉 = max
(휋,푐,퐼)
{
퐿휋,푐,퐼푉 + 푓(푐, 푉 )− 훾
2푉
(휋휎푊푉푊 )
2
}
(30)
where
퐿휋,푐,퐼 = ∂푡 + (퐻
1−훼퐼훼 − 훿퐻)∂퐻
+ ((푟 + 휋휎휃)푊 + 푌 − 푐− 퐼)∂푊 + 1
2
(휋휎푊 )∂푊푊
is the diﬀerential operator associated to the agent’s wealth and health status under the
strategy (휋, 푐, 퐼). In the above equations, an alphabetical subscript indicates a partial
derivative and we have omitted the dependence of the functions on the agent’s age,
wealth and health status for ease of notation.
Maximizing the right hand side of the HJB equation (30) with respect to 휋, 푐 and
퐼 we ﬁnd that the optimal rules can be computed as
휋∗ =
휃푉 푉푊
휎푊 (훾푉 2푊 − 푉 푉푊푊 )
, (31)
푐∗ = 푎+ 푉
(
휌
푉푊
)휀
, (32)
퐼∗ = 퐻
(
훼푉퐻
푉푊
) 1
1−훼
. (33)
Substituting these expressions into the HJB equation and simplifying the resulting
expression gives a nonlinear partial diﬀerential equation for the agent’s indirect utility.31
Unfortunately, no closed form solution to this equation is known except for the case of
health independent mortality which was solved in the previous section. Nonetheless, as
31For details see equation (54) in the appendix.
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we now explain, we can use the explicit solution to this special case as a benchmark in
order to obtain an approximate solution for the general case by expanding the indirect
utility in powers of 휆1.
Denote by 푛 the order of the expansion and let us expand the indirect utility function
of a living agent as
푉 ≈ 푉0 + 휆1푉1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅+ 1
푚!
휆푚1 푉푚 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
1
푛!
휆푛1푉푛.
Here 푉0 = 푉0(푡,푊,퐻) is the agent’s indirect utility function in the case of health
independent mortality and
푉푚 = 푉푚(푡,푊,퐻) =
∂푚
∂휆푚1
푉 (푡,푊,퐻)
∣∣∣∣
휆1=0
is the 푚th order correction induced by the presence of health dependent mortality. Sub-
stituting this approximation of the indirect utility function into the HJB equation and
expanding the resulting equation in powers of 휆1 gives a sequence of partial diﬀerential
equations which can be solved recursively starting from the known function 푉0(⋅). Once
the correction terms have been computed up to the desired order of expansion, one can
obtain an approximation of the optimal portfolio, consumption and health investment
by substituting the expansion of the indirect utility function into equations (31), (32)
and (33) and expanding the resulting expressions in powers of 휆1.
In order to implement the above method it is necessary to select the accuracy of
the approximation by ﬁxing the number of terms to include in the expansion. Since
the intensity parameter 휆1 is expected to be small,
32 we can be reasonably conﬁdent
that the expansion method already delivers good approximations of the indirect utility
function and optimal rules at the ﬁrst order. While higher order approximations can
also be computed, we will restrict ourselves to this ﬁrst order solution because it allows
for an intuitive analysis of the optimal rules.
32This conjecture is conﬁrmed by preliminary structural estimation results which show that the value
of 휆1 needed to ﬁt the HRS data is of the order of 10
−3 (Hugonnier et al., 2009).
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Theorem 2 Assume that equations (17), (25) and
퐴+ 휉
(
(훼퐵(푇 ))
훼
1−훼 − 훿
)
> 푟 − 휆0 + 휃
2
훾
≥ 0 (34)
hold where 퐴 and the function 퐵(⋅) are deﬁned as in Theorem 1. Up to a ﬁrst order
approximation, the agent’s indirect utility is
푉 (푡,푊,퐻) = 푉0(푡,푊,퐻)− 휆1
퐻휉
Δ(푡)푉0(푡,푊,퐻) (35)
and generates the approximate optimal portfolio, consumption and health investment
strategy given by
휋1(푡,푊,퐻) = 휋0(푡,푊,퐻), (36)
푐1(푡,푊,퐻) = 푐0(푡,푊,퐻)− 휆1
퐻휉
Δ(푡)(1− 휀)퐴푁(푡,푊,퐻), (37)
퐼1(푡,푊,퐻) = 퐼0(푡,퐻) +
휆1
퐻휉
Δ(푡)(훼퐵(푡))
훼
1−훼 휂푁(푡,푊,퐻). (38)
In the above equations, Δ(⋅) is a nonnegative function of the agent’s age which is deﬁned
in the appendix, 휂 = 훼휉/(1−훼) and the functions 푉0(⋅), 휋0(⋅), 푐0(⋅), 퐼0(⋅) and 푁(⋅) are
deﬁned as in Theorem 1.
The restriction imposed by equation (34) is a transversality condition which guarantees
that the ﬁrst order correction to the agent’s indirect utility is well deﬁned. Under
this restriction, equation (35) and the nonnegativity of the functions 푉0(⋅) and Δ(⋅)
imply that the presence of health dependent mortality reduces the agent’s indirect
utility. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Indeed, adding a positive
health dependent component to the mortality rate triggers a mechanical decrease in the
survival probability and hence also a decrease in the indirect utility since the agent has
a preference for life.
Compared to the case of health independent mortality, the presence of health depen-
dent mortality decreases the agent’s life expectancy and leads to two conﬂicting eﬀects
whose interaction determines the change in the agent’s optimal consumption. First,
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an increase in the mortality intensity reduces the implicit value of the agent’s income
and, hence, incites him to decrease his consumption through a wealth eﬀect. Second, a
reduction in the agent’s life expectancy reduces the need to save for the future and, thus,
leads the agent to increase his consumption through an intertemporal substitution eﬀect.
When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is smaller than unity, the wealth eﬀect
dominates and the agent decreases his consumption relative to the health independent
mortality case. Conversely, when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is greater
than unity, the substitution eﬀect dominates and the agent increases his consumption.
Exact cancelation of the two eﬀects occurs when 휀 ≡ 1 in which case mortality, be it
health dependent or not, has no impact on the optimal consumption plan.
Equation (36) shows that, although it aﬀects the repartition of the agent’s wealth
between ﬁnancial and human capital, the presence of health dependent mortality has
no ﬁrst order eﬀect on his optimal portfolio share. As in the case of health independent
mortality, this is due to the fact that portfolio rules are insensitive to discounting
considerations in the absence of dynamic hedging motives. Indeed, the ﬁrst order
portfolio is obtained by performing a perturbation of the agent’s problem around the
optimal rules associated with the case of health independent mortality. Since the optimal
health status associated with that case evolves in a deterministic way, it follows that
the investment opportunity set which is relevant to the determination of the ﬁrst order
rules is also deterministic and this implies that there is no ﬁrst order correction to the
agent’s portfolio.
Since the constant 휂 and the functions 퐵(⋅), Δ(⋅) and 푁(⋅) are nonnegative, equation
(38) shows that health dependent mortality induces the agent to increase his health
investment. The intuition behind this result is again straightforward. The presence
of health dependent mortality mechanically increases the agent’s death intensity and,
thus, decreases his life expectancy compared to the case of health independent mortality.
Since the agent has a preference for life, he responds to this decrease in life expectancy by
increasing his health investment in order to improve his health status and, thus, partially
mitigate the impact of health dependent mortality. As can be seen from the fact that the
right hand side of equation (38) depends on the agent’s wealth and health status, this
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in turn implies that health dependent mortality introduces substitution eﬀects between
health investment, consumption and ﬁnancial investments at the optimum.
In order to better understand these substitution eﬀects we now study the compar-
ative statics of the health investment and portfolio shares with respect to the agent’s
ﬁnancial wealth and health status. Assume that 퐶(⋅) is negative, for otherwise the
optimal portfolio is a monotone decreasing function of ﬁnancial wealth and let
퐼푠(푡,푊,퐻) ≡ 퐼1(푡,푊,퐻)
푊
(39)
denote the agent’s health investment share. Using this deﬁnition together with equations
(36) and (38) it is easily shown that the comparative statics of the agent’s health
investment and portfolio shares can be represented graphically as in Figure 1 for some
functions 퐺(⋅), 퐻(⋅) and 퐻(⋅) ≤ 퐻(⋅) which are deﬁned in the appendix. Since health
dependent mortality has no ﬁrst order eﬀect on the optimal portfolio share, the com-
parative statics of the ﬁrst order portfolio share are exactly the same as those discussed
in the previous section. We will therefore focus our analysis on the comparative statics
of the health investment share.
Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of a change in the agent’s ﬁnancial wealth. As ﬁnancial
wealth increases, the liquidity constraint induced by the presence of minimal con-
sumption expenditures softens and, consequently, the agent has additional capital that
can be allocated to health investment, consumption and/or ﬁnancial investments. To
decide on the allocation of this surplus, the agent compares the return on health
investments to those of the other available opportunities. The latter are independent
of the agent’s health status but the former is not. In particular, the speciﬁcation of the
health production function and of the mortality rate imply that the return on health
investments decreases as the agent’s health status improves. The convexity of both
the health adjustment costs and the intensity function implies that, for low health
status (below 퐻(⋅)) this return is very high and encourages the agent to increase his
health investment share in response to an increase in ﬁnancial wealth. In contrast,
for high health status (above 퐻(⋅)) the return on health investments is much lower
and this prompts the agent to decrease his health investment share at the beneﬁt of
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Figure 1: Comparative statics of the ﬁrst order rules
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Notes: This ﬁgure illustrates the comparative statics of the ﬁrst order portfolio and
health investment shares predicted by Theorem 2 under the assumption that 퐶(⋅) ≤ 0.
The solid line plots the minimal level of ﬁnancial wealth needed to cover subsistence
consumption needs; the vertical dotted lines plot the loci of points where 퐼푠푊 ≡ 0 and
휋푊 ≡ 0; and the dashed curve indicates the ﬁnancial wealth and health status levels
where 퐼푠퐻 ≡ 0.
portfolio, consumption and/or savings. Exact cancelation of the two eﬀect occurs along
the vertical locus 퐻 = 퐻(⋅) where the optimal health investment share is insensitive to
changes in ﬁnancial wealth.
An improvement in the agent’s health status leads to two opposite eﬀects. First, a
better health status implies a lower return to health investments through a lower mortal-
ity rate and a lower eﬀectiveness of health investments. Both reductions encourage the
agent to decrease his health investment. Second, an improvement in health status relaxes
the agent’s liquidity constraint through an increase in the present value of disposable
income and, hence, encourages the agent to increase his health investment share. At low
ﬁnancial wealth (below 퐺(⋅)) the marginal relaxation of the agent’s liquidity constraint
dominates the decrease in the return to health investments and, consequently, the agent
increases his health investment share in response to an improvement in his health status.
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Conversely, at high ﬁnancial wealth (above 퐺(⋅)) the marginal relaxation of the agent’s
constraint is dominated by the decrease in the return to health investments and the
agent decreases his health investment share. Exact cancelation of the two eﬀects occurs
along the locus 푊 = 퐺(⋅) where the optimal health investment share is insensitive to
changes in the agent’s health status.
Interestingly, the region of the state space below the locus 푊 = 퐺(⋅) and to the
left of the locus 퐻 = 퐻(⋅) is characterized by health investment shares that increase
with respect to both ﬁnancial wealth and health status. In this region, an adverse
ﬁnancial shock is followed by a reduction in the health investment share since the agent’s
resources are barely suﬃcient to cover his minimal consumption needs. This results in
lower future health and hence in lower future income to which the agent reacts by
reducing his health investment share even further. Put diﬀerently, this region of the
state space can be seen as a poverty trap in which adverse shocks get ampliﬁed through
reductions in the optimal health investment share.
The above discussion shows that, contrary to the partial success of its health inde-
pendent mortality counterpart, the model with health dependent mortality can poten-
tially reproduce the empirical patterns of portfolio and health investment shares. In
particular, there exists a non trivial region of the state space given by:
풜푡 =
{
(푊,퐻) ∈ ℝ× ℝ+ : 푊 ≥ 퐺(푡,퐻) and 퐻(푡) ≤ 퐻 ≤ 퐻(푡)
}
where predicted portfolio shares profactually increase with ﬁnancial wealth and health
status while predicted health investment shares profactually decrease with ﬁnancial
wealth and health status.
As a ﬁnal check, it is also of interest to gauge the model’s performance at reproducing
observed links between health, wealth and mortality. For that purpose, we can obtain
the closed-form life expectancy of a retired agent that is predicted by the model as
follows:
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Proposition 2 Assume that equations (17), (25), (34) and
Φ−1 = 휆0 + 휉
(
(훼퐵(푇 ))
훼
1−훼 − 훿
)
> 0 (40)
hold true. Up to a ﬁrst order approximation, the life expectancy of a retired agent is
independent of wealth and given by
ℓ(퐻) =
1
휆0
(
1− 휆1
퐻휉
Φ
)
. (41)
Proposition 2 reveals that, up to a ﬁrst order, the remaining time horizon of a retired
agent is given as an increasing function of the agent’s health status and is independent
of ﬁnancial wealth. Note also that longevity increases in the shadow price of health
evaluated at retirement, 퐵(푇 ). These two results are consistent with the ﬁndings of De
Nardi et al. (2009) who ﬁnd positive eﬀects of both health and permanent income on
longevity. Indeed, recall from equation (18) that the net present value of the agent’s
disposable income is 푃 (푡,퐻) = 퐵(푡)퐻 + 퐶(푡), an increasing function of the shadow
price and health status. The independence of life expectancy from ﬁnancial wealth 푊푡
is also conﬁrmed empirically for AHEAD data by Hurd et al. (2001), once current health
status is accounted for.33
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that the observed co-movements between ﬁnancial and health statuses
and investments can jointly be explained by a parsimonious model that integrates two
well-accepted, but otherwise segmented, Health and Financial Economics frameworks.
Our theoretical results conﬁrm that endogenous mortality, positive health elasticities of
labor income, convex health adjustment costs and generalized recursive, non-homothetic
preferences are all key ingredients in understanding individual ﬁnancial and health
choices. Admittedly a more complete investigation of the model’s properties will have
to rely on a thorough econometric evaluation, yet preliminary results based on cross-
33See in particular Table 20 in Hurd et al. (2001). Note that Attanasio and Emmerson (2003) however
ﬁnd a joint eﬀect of ﬁnancial wealth on mortality using British Retirement Survey BRS data.
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sectional perspectives appear very encouraging and conﬁrm the model’s good perfor-
mance (Hugonnier et al., 2009).
Despite its parsimony, we ﬁnd it reassuring that the proposed model fares so well. We
believe it speaks in favor of it being used as a workhorse for additional developments
either along the lines we have suggested or along others. One avenue that we ﬁnd
particularly promising is the cyclical implications of the model. If adverse economic
conditions in recessions lead to adjustments in health investments and if the resulting
changes in the health status aﬀect the willingness to hold risky ﬁnancial assets, then
this might point towards interesting predictions for the business cycle properties of asset
markets. We leave these issues for a future research agenda.
We have voluntarily selected a high level of abstraction at a cost of realism. Many
interesting and possibly relevant issues have thus been set aside. For example, our
choice of deterministic health, although standard in Health Economics, may fruitfully
be questioned. We could conjecture that increased background health risk leads to even
more prudent portfolios or to the maintenance of a health buﬀer stock. Conversely,
introducing health, work or life insurance as well as bequests might aﬀect the results
in the opposite way. Finally, by focusing on the cross-sectional dimension for our
descriptive statistics, we have not fully exploited all the information contained with
the data set or the model. Estimating the latter in the panel dimension could provide
for interesting subsequent empirical work.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Using equation (16) and the fact that, in the absence of wealth
eﬀects, the health status is deterministic we deduce that the present value of the agent’s
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disposable income can be written as
푃 (푡,퐻푡) = 퐶(푡) + sup
퐼≥0
∫ ∞
푡
푒−푟(푠−푡)(훽(푠)퐻푠 − 퐼푠)d푠, (42)
where 훽(⋅) is the deterministic function deﬁned by
훽(푡) = 푌퐻(푡,퐻) = 훽
e + 1{푇≤푡}(훽r − 훽e).
Let 풫(푡,퐻) = 푃 (푡,퐻)−퐶(푡) denote the value function of the optimization problem
on the right hand side of equation (42). The dynamics of the health status and the
linearity of the objective function imply that 풫(⋅) is increasing and homogenous of
degree one with respect to health. Using these properties it can be shown that 풫(⋅) and
the optimal investment policy are given by
풫(푡,퐻) = 퐵(푡)퐻,
퐼0(푡,퐻) = 퐻(훼풫퐻(푡,퐻))
1
1−훼 = 퐻(훼퐵(푡))
1
1−훼 ,
for some nonnegative function 퐵(⋅) of the agent’s age which solves the Hamilton–Jacobi–
Bellman equation
(푟 + 훿)퐵(푡) = 퐵′(푡) + 훽(푡) + max푥≥0 (푥훼퐵(푡)− 푥)
= 퐵′(푡) + 훽(푡) + Φ퐵(푡)
1
1−훼 , (43)
subject to the transversality condition
lim
푡→∞ 푒
−푟푡퐵(푡)퐻0푡 = 0, (44)
where 퐻0 denotes the path of the agent’s health status under the optimal investment
strategy and we have set Φ = (1− 훼)훼 훼1−훼 .
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Since the function 훽(⋅) becomes age independent after the retirement date, the
solution to the above ODE is given by
퐵(푡) = 1{푇>푡}퐵e(푡) + 1{푇≤푡}퐵r
for some pair (퐵r, 퐵e(⋅)) such that 퐵r ≥ 0 solves the steady state equation
푔(퐵r) = 훽
r − (푟 + 훿)퐵r + Φ퐵
1
1−훼
r = 0, (45)
and the function 퐵e(⋅) solves equation (43) on the time interval [0, 푇 ] subject to the
value matching condition 퐵e(푇 ) = 퐵r. Furthermore, for any such solution the associated
health status process satisﬁes
d퐻0푡 = 퐻
0
푡
(
(훼퐵r)
훼
1−훼 − 훿
)
d푡, (46)
for all 푡 ≥ 푇 and it follows that the transversality condition (44) is equivalent to the
requirement that 푔′(퐵r) < 0.
Summarizing the above results, the problem reduces to ﬁnding a constant 퐵r ≥ 0
and a function 퐵e(⋅) ≥ 0 such that
푔(퐵r) = 0 > 푔
′(퐵r), (47)
퐵′e(푡) = (푟 + 훿)퐵e(푡)− 훽e − Φ퐵e(푡)
1
1−훼 , (48)
퐵e(푇 ) = 퐵r. (49)
Unfortunately, these equations do not admit closed form solutions in general so we will
have to prove that, under condition (17), there exists a unique solution which can then
be computed numerically.
Straightforward analysis shows that the function 푔(⋅) satisﬁes 푔(0) = 훽r > 0 as well
as 푔′(0) = −(푟 + 훿) < 0 and attains a unique minimum over the positive real line. The
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value of this minimum is explicitly given by
min
푥≥0
푔(푥) = 푔
(
(1/훼)(푟 + 훿)
1
훼
−1
)
= 훽r − (푟 + 훿) 1훼 .
Under condition (17), the minimal value is negative and it follows that there exists a
unique nonnegative 퐵r which satisﬁes the requirements of equation (47). Given 퐵r, the
existence of a unique nonnegative solution to the boundary value problem in equations
(48) and (49) follows from standard results on ﬁrst order ODEs. □
Proof of Theorem 1. When the mortality rate is independent of the health status, the
agent’s problem is equivalent to that of equation (23) given the initial capital푁(푡,푊,퐻).
In particular, the optimal investment is the one of Proposition 1 and the optimal
consumption, optimal portfolio and value function can be computed as
푐0 = 푎+ 푥0,
휋0 = 휈0푁(푡,푊,퐻)/푊,
푉0(푡,푊,퐻) = 퐹 (푡,푁(푡,푊,퐻)),
where 퐹 (⋅) and (푥0, 휈0) denote, respectively, the value function and the optimal strategy
for the problem of equation (23).
Following Svensson (1989), Duﬃe and Epstein (1992) and Duﬃe and Lions (1992)
among others we have that the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation associated with the
latter problem is given by
휆0퐹 = max
(푥,휈)
{
퐿푥,휈푁 퐹 + 푓(푥+ 푎, 퐹 )−
훾
2퐹
(휈휎푁퐹푁 )
2
}
subject to the transversality condition
lim
푡→∞ 푒
−휆0푡퐸0[퐹 (푡,푁0푡 )] = 0, (50)
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where 푁0 denotes the path of the agent’s total disposable wealth under the optimal
consumption and portfolio strategy and
퐿푥,휈푁 = ∂푡 + ((푟 + 휈휎휃)푁 − 푥)∂푁 +
1
2
(휈휎푁)2∂푁푁
is the diﬀerential operator associated to (푡,푁) under the strategy (푥, 휈). Since the
agent’s faces an inﬁnite horizon problem with a constant investment opportunity set
and does not receive any income through time, it must be the case that 퐹 (⋅) is time
independent. On the other hand, the speciﬁcation of the agent’s preferences and the
dynamics of the process푁 in equation (22) imply that 퐹 (⋅) is increasing and homogenous
of degree one with respect to the agent’s total disposable wealth.
Using these properties in conjunction with HJB equation, we obtain that the value
function and the optimal strategy are given by 퐹 (푁) = 휙푁 and
푥0 = 휌
휀휙1−휀푁, (51)
휈0 = 휃/(훾휎), (52)
for some nonnegative constant 휙 which solves
휆0휙 = max
(푥,휈)
{
휙(푟 + 휈휎휃 − 푥) + 푓(푥+ 푎, 휙)− 훾
2
휙(휈휎)2
}
This equation admits a well-deﬁned solution if and only if the constant 퐴 of equation
(25) is strictly positive. In this case, 휙 = 휌(퐴/휌)
1
1−휖 and substituting this into the
deﬁnition of the optimal consumption plan we conclude that 푥0 = 퐴푁 as required.
In order to complete the proof we need to show that under condition (25) the above
solution satisﬁes (50). Using equation (22) and the deﬁnition of the candidate optimal
strategy we obtain that the agent’s total disposable wealth evolves according to
d푁0푡 = 푁
0
푡 (푟 −퐴)d푡+푁0푡 (휃/훾)(d푍푡 + 휃d푡).
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Combining this expression with well-known results on the expectation of the geometric
Brownian motion gives
푒−휆0푡퐸0[퐹 (푡,푁0푡 )] = 푒
−휆0푡퐸0[푣푁0푡 ] = 푒
−(휆0−푟−휃2/훾+퐴)푡푣푁0,
and it follows that condition (25) is necessary and suﬃcient for both the feasibility of
푥0 and the validity of the transversality condition. □
Proof of Theorem 2. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation associated with the agent’s
problem is given by (30) subject to
lim
푡→∞퐸0
[
푒−
∫ 푡
0 휆(퐻
∗
푠 )d푠푉 (푡,푊 ∗푡 , 퐻
∗
푡 )
]
= 0, (53)
where 푊 ∗ and 퐻∗ denote the path of the agent’s wealth and health status under the
optimal strategy. Maximizing the right hand side of the HJB equation with respect to
휋, 푐 and 퐼 gives the candidate optimal strategy of equations (32)–(33) and substituting
these back into equation (30) shows that the HJB equation can be written as
휆(퐻)푉 = 퐿∗푉 + 푓(푐, 푉 )− 훾휃
2푉 푉 4푊
2(훾푉 2푊 − 푉 푉푊푊 )2
(54)
where
퐿∗ = ∂푡 + ((퐼∗/퐻)훼 − 훿)퐻∂퐻
+ ((푟 + 휋∗휎휃)푊 + 푌 − 푐∗ − 퐼∗)∂푊 + 1
2
(휋∗휎푊 )2∂푊푊
is the diﬀerential operator associated to the process (푡,퐻,푊 ) under the optimal strategy.
Consider the approximate value function given by
푉 (푡,푊,퐻) = 푉0(푡,푊,퐻) + 휆1푉1(푡,푊,퐻) + 표(휆
2
1) (55)
where the function
푉1(푡,푊,퐻) =
∂푉
∂휆1
(푡,푊,퐻)
∣∣∣∣
휆1=0
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is the ﬁrst order correction induced by the presence of health-dependent mortality.
Substituting this approximation of 푉 (⋅) into the HJB equation and expanding the
resulting expression to the ﬁrst order in 휆1 we obtain that the functions 푉0(⋅) and
푉1(⋅) solve the system of partial diﬀerential equations given by
휆0푉0 = 퐿
0푉0 + 푓(푐0, 푉0)− 훾휃
2푉0푉
4
0푊
2(훾푉 20푊 − 푉0푉0푊푊 )2
, (56)
휆0푉1 = 퐿
0푉1 + 푓푉 (푐0, 푉0)푉1 − 푉0
퐻휉
+
훾휃2(푉1푉
4
0푊 − 2푉 20 푉 30푊푉1푊 )
2(훾푉 20푊 − 푉0푉0푊푊 )2
, (57)
where
퐿0 = ∂푡 + (퐻
1−훼퐼훼0 − 훿퐻)∂퐻
+ ((푟 + 휋0휎휃)푊 + 푌 − 푐0 − 퐼0)∂푊 + 1
2
(휋0휎푊 )
2∂푊푊
is the diﬀerential operator associated to the optimal strategy (휋0, 푐0, 퐼0) of the health-
independent mortality case. Similarly, substituting equation (55) into equations (32)–
(33) and expanding the resulting expressions shows that a ﬁrst order approximation of
the optimal strategy is
휋1 =
휃푁(푡,푊,퐻)
훾휎푊
+ 표(휆21), (58)
푐1 = 푐0 + 휆1(푉0푊 /휌)
−휀푉1푉0푊 − 휀푉0푉1푊
푉0푊
+ 표(휆21), (59)
퐼1 = 퐼0 + 휆1훼퐼
훼
0
푉0퐻푉1푊 − 푉1퐻푉0푊
(1− 훼)푉 20푊
+ 표(휆21), (60)
where the function 푁(⋅) is deﬁned as in (21). Using the result of Theorem 1, the solution
to (56) is given by
푉0(푡,푊,퐻) = 휌(퐴/휌)
1
1−휀푁(푡,푊,퐻).
Substituting this function into equation (57) and inspecting the resulting linear partial
diﬀerential equation, we deduce that
푉1(푡,푊,퐻) = −Δ(푡)
퐻휉
푉0(푡,푊,퐻) (61)
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for some function Δ(⋅) of the agent’s age which solves the ﬁrst order ordinary diﬀerential
equation
Δ′(푡) = Δ(푡)
(
휉(훼퐵(푡))
훼
1−훼 − 휉훿 +퐴
)
− 1. (62)
Since the function 퐵(⋅) becomes age independent after the retirement date, the solution
to the above ODE is given by
Δ(푡) = 1{푇>푡}Δe(푡) + 1{푇≤푡}Δr,
where Δr is the unique solution to the steady state equation
0 = Δr
(
휉(훼퐵r)
훼
1−훼 − 휉훿 +퐴
)
− 1, (63)
and the function Δe(⋅) solves the ordinary diﬀerential equation (62) on the time interval
[0, 푇 ] subject to the value matching condition Δe(푇 ) = Δr. The unique solution to this
equation is given by
Δe(푡) = 푒
− ∫ 푇푡 휁(푠)d푠Δr +
∫ 푇
푡
푒−
∫ 푠
푡 휁(푢)d푢d푠,
where
휁(푡) = 휉(훼퐵(푡))
훼
1−훼 − 휉훿 +퐴.
Now, substituting this function as well as 푉0(⋅) and 푉1(⋅) into equations (58), (59) and
(60) gives the result reported in the statement and the proof will be complete once we
show that the restrictions imposed by equations (25) and (34) are suﬃcient to guarantee
that the approximate value function satisﬁes a suitable transversality condition.
To unveil the nature of this approximate condition, consider the original transver-
sality condition in equation (53) and expand the quantity inside the expected value to
the ﬁrst order in 휆1. This gives
푒−
∫ 푡
0 휆(퐻
∗
푠 )d푠푉 (푡,푊 ∗푡 , 퐻
∗
푡 ) = 푒
−휆0푡푉0(푡,푊 0푡 , 퐻
0
푡 ) (64)
+ 휆1푒
−휆0푡 (푉1(푡,푊 0푡 , 퐻0푡 )−ℋ0푡푉0(푡,푊 0푡 , 퐻0푡 ))+ 표(휆21),
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where 푊 0 and 퐻0 denote the path of the agent’s wealth and health status under the
optimal strategy (휋0, 푐0, 퐼0) of the health independent mortality case and we have set
ℋ0푡 =
∫ 푡
0
(퐻0푠 )
−휉d푠.
Since the expectation of the ﬁrst term on the right of equation (64) converges to zero
due the transversality condition of the health-independent mortality case, this implies
that the transversality conditions associated to the ﬁrst order approximation can be
formulated as
lim
푡→∞퐸0
[
푒−휆0푡
(
푉1(푡,푊
0
푡 , 퐻
0
푡 )−ℋ0푡푉0(푡,푊 0푡 , 퐻0푡 )
)]
= 0. (65)
Let 푡 ≥ 푇 and denote by Γ푡 the quantity in the above expectation. Using the deﬁnition
of ℋ0 in conjunction with the dynamics of 퐻0 in equation (46) we obtain
ℋ0푡 = ℋ0푇 + (1/휁)
(
(퐻0푇 )
−휉 − (퐻0푡 )−휉
)
.
where we have set 휁 = 휁(푇 ). Combining this expression with equation (61) and using
the deﬁnition of the function 푁(⋅) we obtain
퐸0 [Γ푡] = 푒
−휆0푡휙퐸0
[
((1/휁)−Δr) (퐻0푡 )−휉푁0푡 −
(
ℋ0푇 + (1/휁)(퐻0푇 )−휉
)
푁0푡
]
= 푒−(휆0−푟−휃
2/훾+퐴)푡휙
(
푒−휁(푡−푇 )퐶1 − 퐶2
)
푁0
where 휙 and 푁0 are deﬁned as in the proof of Proposition 1, the second equality follows
from the law of iterated expectations, the dynamics of the agent’s health status in
equation (46) and the fact that the process 푁0 is a geometric Brownian motion; and
we have set
퐶1 = ((1/휁)−Δr) (퐻0푇 )−휉,
퐶2 =ℋ0푇 + (1/휁)(퐻0푇 )−휉.
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Finally, taking the limit on both sides of the above expression and using the fact that
the constants 퐶1 and 퐶2 are ﬁnite shows that conditions (17) and (17) are necessary
and suﬃcient for the validity of equation (65). □
Proof of Proposition 2. Using standard results on Poisson point processes we have that
the life expectancy of a retired agent is given by
ℓ(푊푡, 퐻푡) = 퐸푡[휏 ] = 퐸푡
[∫ ∞
푡
푒−
∫ 푠
푡 휆(퐻
∗
푢)d푢d푠
]
where 퐻∗ denotes the path of the agent’s health status under the optimal strategy.
Applying the Feynman-Kac formula we have that the function 퐸 solves the partial
diﬀerential equation
휆(퐻)ℓ(푊,퐻) = 퐿∗ℓ(푊,퐻) + 1 (66)
where 퐿∗ is the diﬀerential operator associated to (푊,퐻) under the optimal strategy. In
accordance with the method used in the rest of the paper, we consider an approximation
of the form
ℓ(푊,퐻) = ℓ0(푊,퐻) + 휆1ℓ1(푊,퐻) + 표(휆
2
1)
where ℓ0(⋅) = 1/휆0 is the life expectancy associated with the health independent
mortality case and
ℓ1(푊,퐻) =
∂ℓ(푊,퐻)
∂휆1
∣∣∣∣
휆1=0
is the ﬁrst order correction induced by the presence of health dependent mortality.
Substituting this approximation into equation (66) and expanding the result in powers
of 휆1 shows that the function 퐸1(⋅) is a solution to the partial diﬀerential equation
휆0ℓ1 = 퐿
0ℓ1 − 1
휆0퐻휉
where 퐿0 is the diﬀerential operator associated to (푊,퐻) under the optimal strategy of
the health independent mortality case. Guessing a wealth independent solution of the
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form ℓ1(푊,퐻) = 휛퐻
−휉 leads to
−휛휆0 = 휛휉
(
(훼퐵(푡))
훼
1−훼 − 훿
)
+
1
휆0
and solving that equation for 휛 gives the desired result. The restriction imposed
by equation (40) is a transversality condition which guarantees that the ﬁrst order
correction to the agent’s life expectancy is negative and increasing in the agent’s health
status. Its derivation being similar to that of equation (34) we omit the details. □
B Construction of Figure 1
Assume that the agent’s ﬁnancial wealth, 푊 , is nonnegative for otherwise the compar-
ative statics of the health investment share with respect to health are simply reversed.
Diﬀerentiating equation (38) with respect to the agent’s health status shows that the
optimal health investment share decreases with the agent’s health status if
푊 ≥ 퐺(푡,퐻) = −푃 (푡,퐻) + 퐵(푡)
휉
퐻 +
훼퐵(푡)
휆1휂휉Δ(푡)
퐻1+휉
and increases otherwise. Similarly, diﬀerentiating equation (39) with respect to ﬁnancial
wealth shows that the optimal health investment share decreases with the agent’s
ﬁnancial wealth if and only if 퐻 ≥ 퐻(푡) where 퐻(⋅) is deﬁned implicitly by
훼퐵(푡)퐻(푡)1+휉 + 휆1휂Δ(푡)푃 (푡,퐻(푡)) = 0. (67)
In particular, the portfolio share increases with the health status as long as ﬁnancial
wealth is positive; and increasing in ﬁnancial wealth if and only if the agent’s future
income is insuﬃcient to cover his minimal consumption needs in the sense that 푃 (푡,퐻) ≤
0 or, equivalently,
퐻 ≤ 퐻(푡) = −퐶(푡)/퐵(푡). (68)
Figure 1 summarizes these results by providing a graphical representation of the com-
parative statics in the (푊,퐻)−space.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Non retired Retired
All sample Single Couple All sample Single Couple
Socio-demographic
Age 57.6 58.7 57.2 75.0 77.8 73.0
Male 40% 29% 44% 42% 22% 57%
Female 60% 71% 56% 58% 78% 43%
Health status
Poor (퐻 = 1) 7% 11% 6% 11% 14% 9%
Fair (퐻 = 2) 15% 20% 14% 22% 24% 20%
Good (퐻 = 3) 29% 29% 29% 31% 31% 32%
Very good (퐻 = 4) 32% 27% 34% 26% 23% 28%
Excellent (퐻 = 5) 16% 14% 17% 10% 8% 11%
Health expenditures
Medical $8,755 $10,186 $8,337 $12,848 $15,517 $10,902
(median) $1,350 $1,439 $1,331 $2,303 $2,680 $2,047
Out-of-pocket $1,860 $1,911 $1,845 $3,014 $3,588 $2,593
(median) $800 $700 $840 $1,040 $960 $1,120
Total $10,615 $12,097 $10,182 $15,862 $19,105 $13,495
(median) $2,779 $2,981 $2,729 $5,000 $5,000 $4,788
Asset holdings
Hold safe asset 86% 75% 89% 85% 78% 90%
Hold bond 7% 4% 7% 9% 6% 11%
Hold risk asset 33% 20% 37% 32% 23% 39%
Hold debt 38% 38% 38% 18% 16% 20%
Portfolio composition
Financial wealth $98,727 $62,330 $109,369 $122,573 $74,754 $157,524
Safe assets 57% 63% 55% 65% 70% 62%
Bonds 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 3%
Risky assets 22% 14% 24% 20% 16% 23%
Debt 19% 22% 18% 12% 12% 13%
Observations 8,836 1,999 6,837 10,735 4,532 6,202
Notes: The data source is HRS (RAND version), 5푡ℎ wave. Non-retired (retired)
agents are individuals aged less than 65 (aged 65 and over). The reported ﬁnancial
variables are conditional on non-zero holdings.
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Table 2: Summary statistics by net ﬁnancial wealth and health for non-
retired agents
Net ﬁnancial wealth quintile
Health 1 2 3 4 5
Poor (퐻 = 1)
Wealth −$9,140 $443 $13,352 $51,820 $660,988
푃 (risky > 0) 4% 2% 25% 52% 77%
Risky assets −4% 3% 18% 27% 54%
Health inv. share (total) -387% 1553% 110% 34% 8%
(out-of-pocket) -43% 186% 23% 4% 1%
Fair (퐻 = 2)
Wealth −$9,724 $533 $11,444 $61,875 $446,266
푃 (risky > 0) 5% 1% 20% 54% 82%
Risky assets −12% 2% 13% 33% 54%
Health inv. share (total) -101% 742% 42% 10% 2%
(out-of-pocket) -29% 125% 13% 3% 1%
Good (퐻 = 3)
Wealth −$11,073 $817 $12,825 $62,136 $582,583
푃 (risky > 0) 6% 5% 25% 54% 81%
Risky assets −5% 12% 15% 32% 54%
Health inv. share (total) -62% 222% 28% 6% 1%
(out-of-pocket) -15% 64% 9% 2% 0%
Very good (퐻 = 4)
Wealth −$16,170 $1,070 $13,063 $63,597 $461,875
푃 (risky > 0) 12% 6% 27% 63% 87%
Risky assets −10% 12% 20% 39% 54%
Health inv. share (total) -35% 143% 19% 4% 1%
(out-of-pocket) -10% 47% 6% 1% 0%
Excellent (퐻 = 5)
Wealth −$19,909 $1,007 $12,743 $64,163 $501,961
푃 (risky > 0) 10% 6% 27% 64% 86%
Risky assets −9% 9% 20% 39% 57%
Health inv. share (total) -20% 98% 11% 3% 0%
(out-of-pocket) -3% 28% 4% 1% 0%
Notes: Agents younger than 65 only. The reported values are respectively the mean
of the net ﬁnancial wealth (푊푡), the mean of the probability of holding risky assets
(푃 (휋푡 > 0)), the mean of the risky portfolio share (휋푡) and the median of the health
investment share out of net ﬁnancial wealth (퐼푡/푊푡).
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Table 3: Summary statistics by net ﬁnancial wealth and health for retired
agents
Net ﬁnancial wealth quintile
Health 1 2 3 4 5
Poor (퐻 = 1)
Wealth −$10,088 $490 $13,310 $63,140 $426,698
푃 (risky > 0) 1% 2% 14% 42% 75%
Risky assets 0% 6% 9% 24% 45%
Health inv. share (total) -568% 2366% 147% 28% 7%
(out-of-pocket) -45% 142% 22% 6% 1%
Fair (퐻 = 2)
Wealth −$6,114 $596 $12,683 $59,366 $514,602
푃 (risky > 0) 2% 1% 14% 42% 74%
Risky assets −2% 1% 7% 24% 42%
Health inv. share (total) -245% 710% 46% 12% 2%
(out-of-pocket) -45% 96% 13% 3% 1%
Good (퐻 = 3)
Wealth −$10,911 $718 $13,094 $64,108 $436,456
푃 (risky > 0) 5% 2% 19% 45% 77%
Risky assets −5% 3% 12% 24% 45%
Health inv. share (total) -79% 476% 31% 7% 1%
(out-of-pocket) -18% 77% 10% 2% 0%
Very good (퐻 = 4)
Wealth −$7,108 $960 $13,578 $64,905 $467,585
푃 (risky > 0) 7% 4% 24% 52% 82%
Risky assets −61% 7% 12% 27% 50%
Health inv. share (total) -86% 188% 21% 5% 1%
(out-of-pocket) -14% 53% 7% 2% 0%
Excellent (퐻 = 5)
Wealth −$6,469 $799 $13,195 $64,498 $554,980
푃 (risky > 0) 3% 2% 24% 44% 83%
Risky assets −1% 10% 11% 25% 48%
Health inv. share (total) -53% 177% 14% 3% 1%
(out-of-pocket) -9% 41% 4% 1% 0%
Notes: Agents of age 65 and over only. The reported values are respectively the mean
of the net ﬁnancial wealth (푊푡), the mean of the probability of holding risky assets
(푃 (휋푡 > 0)), the mean of the risky portfolio share (휋푡) and the median of the health
investment share out of net ﬁnancial wealth (퐼푡/푊푡).
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Table 4: Summary statistics by age and health
Age
Health Less than 65 65 to 74 75 to 84 Over 85
Poor (퐻 = 1)
Wealth $13,352 $12,599 $14,640 $12,033
푃 (risky > 0) 25% 18% 12% 8%
Risky assets 18% 11% 8% 5%
Health inv. share (total) 110% 151% 123% 156%
(out-of-pocket) 23% 21% 24% 18%
Fair (퐻 = 2)
Wealth $11,444 $12,453 $13,161 $12,071
푃 (risky > 0) 20% 14% 15% 11%
Risky assets 13% 8% 6% 8%
Health inv. share (total) 42% 51% 45% 46%
(out-of-pocket) 13% 14% 13% 13%
Good (퐻 = 3)
Wealth $12,825 $13,156 $12,918 $13,405
푃 (risky > 0) 25% 21% 18% 8%
Risky assets 15% 13% 14% 6%
Health inv. share (total) 28% 28% 37% 36%
(out-of-pocket) 9% 10% 13% 11%
Very good (퐻 = 4)
Wealth $13,063 $13,704 $13,537 $12,613
푃 (risky > 0) 27% 23% 26% 25%
Risky assets 20% 13% 11% 14%
Health inv. share (total) 19% 20% 24% 25%
(out-of-pocket) 6% 7% 8% 6%
Excellent (퐻 = 5)
Wealth $12,743 $13,691 $12,403 $11,411
푃 (risky > 0) 27% 26% 17% 29%
Risky assets 20% 12% 9% 15%
Health inv. share (total) 11% 11% 16% 42%
(out-of-pocket) 4% 3% 5% 3%
Notes: The reported values are respectively the mean of the net ﬁnancial wealth, of the
probability of holding risky assets (푃 (휋푡 > 0)), of the risky share (휋푡) and the median
of the health investment share of net ﬁnancial wealth (퐼푡/푊푡) for third quintile wealth
level.
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Table 5: Income and health regression
All Non-retired Retired
A. Individual income
Constant 0.0047** 0.0052 0.0091***
(0.0021) (0.0051) (0.0012)
Health 0.0104*** 0.0130*** 0.0065***
(0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0004)
Obs. 19,571 8,836 10,735
B. Household income
Constant 0.0077** 0.0116*** 0.0130***
(0.0022) (0.0053) (0.0013)
Health 0.0141*** 0.0174*** 0.0082***
(0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0004)
Obs. 19,571 8,836 10,735
Notes: Income is divided by 106 and health is measured between 1 (Poor) and 5
(Excellent). The results are robust to sampling weights, additional socio-demographic
regressors, measurement errors, cohort eﬀects and White’s correction of the variance
covariance matrix. Tobit estimations lead to the same conclusions. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses, as well as statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level (***), 5%
level (**) and at the 10% level (*).
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